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[1] For two thinkers so commonly mentioned in the same breath, it is
surprising that there have been so few full-length studies comparing Kierkegaard
and Nietzsche. In this book, Tom Angier brings into dialogue the two figures
who are, he controversially claims, ‘the most significant moral philosophers of
the nineteenth century’ (p. 1). But there is no doubt in whose corner Angier is
holding the towel: the book sets out to support his contention that ‘Kierkegaard
both anticipated, and subjected to detailed critique, Nietzsche’s central arguments
and views in moral philosophy’ (p. 1).
[2] Angier’s discussion is divided into two parts, consisting of three and
two chapters respectively. Chapter 1 investigates the Nietzschean ‘sovereign
individual’, whose most explicit appearance is at the start of the second essay of
On the Genealogy of Morality. Based on the idea that the sovereign individual is
akin to a Kierkegaardian aesthete, chapter 2 explores Kierkegaardian arguments
for the superiority of the ethical life to the aesthetic life in Either/Or. Chapter
3, primarily through a reading of Fear and Trembling, shows why Kierkegaard
sees the need to go beyond the ethical life to the religious. By this point, Angier
thinks he has justified the conclusion that Kierkegaard’s position is ‘sufficiently
well-founded to overcome its main rival within the history of philosophy . . .
Nietzschean sovereign individuality’ (p. 66). In part two, he offers two ‘case
studies’: on truth (chapter 4) – on which topic Kierkegaard is again claimed to
trump Nietzsche – and communication (chapter 5), in which contemporary work
on narrative is used both to offer an interesting twist on a tradition of reading Fear
and Trembling, and to argue – once again – for the superiority of a Kierkegaardian
position to that of Nietzsche. A brief conclusion discusses equality and power in
the two thinkers.
[3] Rather than give the prominence that the secondary literature often
gives to the rather shadowy notion of the Übermensch, it is a promising aspect
of Angier’s reading of Nietzsche that he treats the ‘sovereign individual’ as Niet-
zsche’s ideal. Introducing the ‘hyper-existentialist’ interpretation of this (inwhich
the individual is presented as creating out of nothing, apart from any culture or
history, his own table of values) and a rival ‘biologistic’ interpretation (in which
Nietzsche’s fatalism is stressed, andwhere, as Brian Leiter puts it, each person has
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a ‘fixed psycho-physical constitution’ (p. 15)), Angier argues, following Paul Val-
adier and SimonMay, for a synthesis of the two. The biologistic reading, he argues,
downplays Nietzsche’s emphasis on creativity, but the hyper-existentialist view
requires us to make sense of purely private values, and it seems impossible to see
howany values thus created could possibly have any authority. TheValadier/May
interpretation sees creative originality as self-formation and self-fashioning that
takes place within a socialised context, and so does not require the sovereign indi-
vidual to create entirely unrecognisable new values ex nihilo. However, in one of
the most important sections of the book, Angier argues that even this maximally
coherent picture of Nietzschean sovereign individuality is anticipated and effec-
tively criticised by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus, in his attack on the
‘despair of defiance’ in The Sickness Unto Death. The gist of this criticism is that the
defiant self, like the Nietzschean sovereign individual, recognises no power over
itself: despite its having ‘perseverance and endurance’ (p. 22) as central virtues,
this means it can ultimately conjure up only the appearance of seriousness. It is
thus not a genuine, but a merely ‘hypothetical’, self.
[4] How so? To support Kierkegaard on this Angier, like other Kierkegaard
commentators such as John Davenport, draws on Harry Frankfurt’s work on vo-
litional ambivalence and wholeheartedness. Frankfurt claims that, in the absence
of categorical demands upon thewill, it is ‘insufficiently formed’ (p. 23). If thewill
is free to pursue a profusion of projects and break its own rules, the likely result is
the volitional disunity Frankfurt calls ‘ambivalence’: the inability to ‘settl[e] upon
. . . any coherent affective ormotivational identity’ (p. 22). Binding constraints are
necessary to overcome ambivalence and attain ‘wholeheartedness’: the condition
of having a set of internally consistent volitional characteristics. If this is right,
then the sovereign individual cannot be wholehearted in Frankfurt’s sense. For
if, as Nietzsche claims, our tests are ‘taken before ourselves and before no other
judge’ (Beyond Good and Evil, sect. 241) how, if I am my own examiner, can I be
sure that I won’t let myself cheat?
[5] Chapter 2 offers a defence of the kind of self-choice characteristic of the
Kierkegaardian ethical life against MacIntyre’s by now infamous objection that
this choice is ‘criterionless’. Angier argues for a quite familiar thesis: that the
aesthetic life lacks the possibility of genuine choice as the aesthetic self lacks the
unity necessary for such choice (hence ‘aesthetic choice is no choice’, as Judge
William puts it). This is in part because of what Angier calls the aesthete’s
‘presentism’: his unstable goals and ‘unwillingness to abide by a constant set
of values over time’ makes him ‘over-vulnerable to being swayed by present
stimuli’ (p. 38). Angier somewhat confuses matters here by apparently taking the
author of the Seducer’s Diary, whom he calls ‘Johannes the aesthete’ (p. 38), as
his default instance of the aesthetic life (rather than the unnamed young man A,
the author of most of the papers in Either/Or volume I, and who is the more usual
referent of the term ‘Kierkegaard’s aesthete’). It is an interesting question as to
whether the aesthetic life in general can legitimately be rejected on the basis of
condemning A. (That it can seems to be a common assumption in Kierkegaard
scholarship, but exactly what makes this legitimate is often not explained.) What
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is certainly controversial is to suppose that the aesthetic life in general can be
rejected on the basis of condemning the Seducer, given that the latter is a more
extreme case thanA. In general, though, Angier follows in the tradition of arguing
that self-development requires commitment to ‘life-tasks’, which the aesthete’s
‘presentism’ rules out, and that aestheticism is irrational insofar as the ethical
better delivers what the aesthete really wants.
[6] What of Nietzsche? As noted, Angier claims that Nietzsche’s sovereign
individual is a kind of Kierkegaardian aesthete. As well as the Frankfurtian
claim that without moral absolutes the self lacks volitional constraints, Angier
also notes Nietzsche’s praise of ‘forgetfulness’ and criticism of ‘constancy’. But
the real problem, he argues, lies in the metaphysics of the Nietzschean self, with
its emphasis on multiplicity: the view of the self as an ‘arena of competing forces’
(p. 43). Angier claims thatNietzsche’s criticism of ‘a unitary self and a unitarywill
is reinforced throughout his work’ (p. 43). While he amasses numerous quotes in
support of this claim, there are – as so often with Nietzsche – others that point in
a different direction. For example, what of the following, from ‘On Redemption’
in Thus Spake Zarathustra: ‘this is all my creating and striving, that I create and
carry together into One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident’? This
suggests that Nietzsche does have an idea of unity, involving the imposition of
order on chaos, and that this is a vital component of what he calls ‘giving style’
to one’s character: ‘a great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey all
the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic
plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses
delight the eye ... In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how
the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small.
Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if
only it was a single taste!’ (The Gay Science, sect. 290)
[7] So perhaps the problem is not the lack of a concern for unity, but – as the
end of this quote suggests – the problems inherent in the sovereign individual’s
apparent amoralism. Angier is on stronger ground, I think, when he askswhether
one could trust such a character, and if so, on what basis. The aesthete’s position
makes him unworthy of trust, and thus likely to be ‘a continual fugitive from the
social world’ (p. 46). Nietzsche’s overall admiration for the virtues of stoicism
is, Angier argues, a tacit recognition of a similarity between the Nietzschean and
the aesthetic self (p. 47): the Nietzschean self will be, like A according to Judge
William, ‘a stranger in the world’.
[8] In chapter 3, Angier turns to Kierkegaardian reasons to prefer the reli-
gious to the ethical stage of life through a discussion of Fear and Trembling. That
text’s focus on howAbraham stands as the ‘single individual higher than the [eth-
ical understood as the] universal’; ‘great through an act of purely personal virtue’
(cited p. 53) seems uncomfortably close to the hyper-existentialist view of the
sovereign individual. Why then, Angier asks, isn’t the ethics of Fear and Trembling
a ‘non-ethics of arbitrary wilfulness’ (p. 53)? Again, the answer he gives belongs
to a recognisable tradition of Kierkegaard interpretation, but with an interesting
twist that is not fully revealed until chapter 5.
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[9] Taking seriously the idea that the text is an instance of indirect commu-
nication, Angier sees the pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio as unable
fully to understand that which he describes. As numerous other interpreters have
noted, a hint to this effect is given by the book’s motto, which concerns a mes-
senger who does not understand his own message. The book is about sacrifice
– Abraham’s willingness to resign that which he loves most, while yet receiving
it back with joy – and Angier treats this as prefiguring the specifically Christian
story of the atonement. An ethics of Sittlichkeit, privileging married love and
family life – compare here Judge William’s valorisation of marriage in his first
letter in Either/Or – is a threat to the radical demands of Christian ethics. Angier
suggests that family life encourages self-indulgence and self-deception (‘I’d love
to sell everything I have and give to the poor, but unfortunately I have a wife and
kids to support’). This ‘preferential’ love contrasts with the non-preferential agape
Kierkegaard valorises as fundamental to Christian ethics in Works of Love. (We
should note here, however, that much recent work on Works of Love has stressed
that in that text Kierkegaard does not reject preferential love out of hand.) On
Angier’s interpretation, Kierkegaard is arguing for the idea that the true fulfil-
ment of the individual can come through a life of self-sacrifice, and moreover
that Christianity provides the ‘best rational alternative’ to ‘the ethics of family
love and . . . “ordinary life”’ (p. 59) on the grounds that the greatest vocation is
Christ’s life of absolute self-sacrifice.
[10] Angier treats Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity’s ideal of self-sacrifice
as a rejection of the idea that the welfare of the mass of humanity is of great
value. Certainly, this elitist Nietzsche is a familiar enough figure, but it is worth
noting that here as elsewhere Nietzsche hardly speaks with only one voice: James
Conant has argued, in an interesting essay, for a decidedly non-elitist Nietzsche
on the basis of a reading of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’.1 While Angier notes
that Nietzsche does not reject self-sacrifice per se – consider his repeated emphasis
on self-overcoming – he claims that Nietzschean self-sacrifice ‘is fundamentally
instrumental to self-aggrandisement’ (p. 61); my self-sacrifices are only in the
interests of thework thatmy self does on and for itself. DittoNietzsche’s treatment
of neighbour-love which, being commended only in the interests of self-love, is
hardly neighbour love at all. Nietzsche’s is a ‘fundamentally self-regarding ethic’
(p. 62). His focus on supreme self-sufficiency and self-government means that the
sovereign individual’sworld-view is in tensionwith the ‘virtues of acknowledged
dependence’ (p. 63) that Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, discusses in Dependent
Rational Animals. Moreover, it raises a serious doubt as to whether there could be
any such thing as a Nietzschean society.
[11] As to the twist in chapter 5, in a discussion of the significance of
Abraham’s silence, Angier mounts an interesting argument based on the work of
such figures as MacIntyre and Hauerwas on narrative. MacIntyre’s point that the
1. James Conant, ‘Nietzsche’s Perfectionism: A Reading of “Schopenhauer as Educator”’
in Richard Schacht (ed.),Nietzsche’s Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche’s prelude to Philosophy’s Future
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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notionof an intelligible action ismorebasic thananaction, and that actions become
intelligible by finding their place in a narrative, is here put to work to explain why
Johannes de Silentio is unable to understandAbrahamwith respect to theAkedah.
OnAngier’s story, Johannes dooms to failure his attempt to understand Abraham
because he repeats the error of modern moral theory according to MacIntyre:
aiming to understand Abraham as a self with no history. That is, because he aims
to understand the events of Genesis 22without understanding their relation to the
earlier chapters thereof, it is entirely unsurprising that Johannes finds Abraham’s
actions incomprehensible.
[12] I am sympathetic both to Angier’s claim about the significance of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and, ultimately, to his Kierkegaardian preferences.
However, his interpretation of Nietzsche, while not exactly setting up a straw
man, does sometimes fail to apply theprinciple of hermeneutical charity. Consider
some examples.
[13] On the idea of the tests being taken before oneself alone, we should
note that someNietzsche commentators have seen him as not being committed to
such a radically ‘private’ view at all. In describing the sovereign individual at the
start of chapter 1, Angier curiously overlooks one crucial aspect of Nietzsche’s
discussion of that figure: the claim that the sovereign individual is the ‘animal
which has the right to make a promise’ (GM II 2). Nietzsche describes him as
viewing responsibility as an ‘extraordinaryprivilege’ (ibid.) (rather thanasmerely
a burden), and that this becomes his ‘dominant instinct’; an instinct that he calls
his ‘conscience’ (ibid.) Once we are reminded of this, it becomes easy to see
why some have considered integrity to be a central Nietzschean virtue and why
David Owen, for example, has argued that for Nietzsche integrity serves as ‘the
exhibition of self-mastery since one’s capacity to keep one’s promises to oneself
is dependent on one’s mastery of oneself’.2 Furthermore, these promises are not
only to oneself. In contrast to the picture Angier paints, in which the sovereign
individual is a lawunto himself in a radical (and implausible)way, Owen suggests
that Nietzschean self-mastery must be exhibited ‘publicly by acting in accordance
with the commitments one espouses’.3 (Perhaps this is one implication of the
socialisation thesis Angier adopts from May.) This is supported by the text: the
sovereign individual, Nietzsche claims, ‘gives his word as something which can
be relied on’ (Genealogy of Morals II 2), and is explicitly contrasted with ‘the febrile
whippets whomake a promise when they have no right to do so’ (ibid.). Contrast
this with Angier’s allegations of the sovereign individual’s untrustworthiness. If
the sovereign individual were really the creature of ultimate whim that Angier
is worried about – ‘absolutely freed from the norms that inform the social order’
(p. 11) – it is hard to see why Nietzsche would stress the importance of promise-
keeping, reliability and responsibility to the extent that he does. This seems a
significant weakness in Angier’s account.
[14] Amore speculative suggestion arises fromasking the question of exactly
2. David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity (London: Sage, 1995), p. 117.
3. Ibid., p. 118.
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what role the sovereign individual is supposed to play in Nietzsche’s thought. It
is important to note that Nietzsche describes him as ‘the ripest fruit’ (Genealogy II
2). Some commentators, such as Aaron Ridley, have taken this to mean that the
sovereign individual, far from being anything ever achieved, is ‘a rather misty, if
beautiful, kind of hope for man’s future . . . the vaguest prophecy’.4 This opens
up the possibility that the sovereign individual is a goal for which we should
strive without ever being able to reach.
[15] The idea of there being great value in striving for standards we nev-
ertheless cannot hope fully to reach, in turn, suggests echoes of Kierkegaard’s
view of Christ as the Pattern for a human life. This connects with the questions
that arise from chapter 3 above. First, Nietzsche would surely want to ask, what
would count as non question-begging evidence in favour of the claim that a life
of self-sacrifice was the most valuable kind of life? And second, even to those
of us who do not share Nietzsche’s animus to Christianity; who stand within the
Christian tradition, there are still major questions about the role of self-sacrifice
in what it means to ‘follow Christ’. The second love commandment, Kierkegaard
points out in Works of Love, maintains room for an appropriate, non-selfish form
of self-love: am I perhaps called, therefore, to something less than absolute self-
sacrifice? Even if it is true, as Angier suggests, that fulfilment can come through
self-sacrifice, does it follow from this that maximal fulfilment comes through
maximal self-sacrifice?
[16] I have a similar hesitation about Angier’s charge that the sovereign
individual, like the defiant self, is unwilling to acknowledge its dependence on
others. It cannot be denied that there are passages in Nietzsche that support this,
but on this as on so many other matters, he speaks with more than one voice. In
both personal correspondence and the often overlooked writings of Nietzsche’s
middle period, for instance, numerous remarks on the importance of friendship
paint a rather different picture from the excessively self-sufficient picture Angier
paints of Nietzsche’s ideal. Some examples: ‘Think what life would be like
without a friend. Could one, would one, have borne it? Dubito.’5 In stark contrast
to the much better known critique of pity in the Genealogy, he also talks about
howwhenwe discover someonewe admire is suffering, wemay grow ‘tenderer . . .
the gulf between us and him seems to be bridged, an approximation to identity
seems to occur. Only now do we conceive it possible that we might give back to
him. . . ’ (Daybreak, sect. 138). There is no hint that these remarks are only about
‘weak’ individuals.
[17] Similarly, in following commentators such as Owen and Ridley who
have stressed Nietzsche’s relation to the Kantian tradition of maturity as self-
government, one might claim that an element of self-reliance and self-mastery is
essential before one can be in the position to ‘come good’ on any other-regarding
ethic: before, that is, one can be ‘an animal with the right to make a promise’.
4. Aaron Ridley, Nietzsche’s Conscience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 146.
5. Oscar Levy (ed.), Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Doubleday Page, 1921),
p. 97.
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(Kierkegaard himself hints at something similar when he suggests that loving
oneself in the right way and loving the neighbour ‘fundamentally . . . are one and
the same thing’.6)
[18] With respect toKierkegaard, I thinkAngier is insufficiently critical of the
Frankfurtian emphasis on volitional unity and wholeheartedness. I believe that
Frankfurt and his Kierkegaardian followers, implicitly or explicitly, exaggerate
the extent to which we may predict and order our lives. As Philip Quinn has
suggested, a focus on unity also brings with it the related danger that faced with
a potentially life-changing decision, we might opt for the line of minimising risk
and thus, in Cora Diamond’s phrase, ‘miss the adventure’ in life. I do not have
space to go into this in detail here, but the overall thought is that the focus on
wholeheartedness, unity and psychic harmony is exaggerated in importance; that
life may be less a matter of volitionally well-ordered plans, and more a matter
of creatively and skilfully managing the tensions that inevitably arise from the
conflict between the plural goods we welcome into our lives.7 If this is right,
Angier’s claim that the telos of the defiant self/sovereign individual is opaque,
that (as Anti-Climacus puts it) his life-project is ‘in the final instance a riddle’
(p. 25) may in fact be a feature of most of our lives, whatever carefully edited and
possibly self-deceived stories we may tell of them.8
[19] Though Angier’s use of recent work on narrative contributes to an
interesting reading of Fear and Trembling, other questions arise. As so often with
philosophical uses of the term ‘narrative’, one wishes for greater precision in
exactly what the term signifies. I have considerable sympathy with the judgment
thatNietzsche’suseof historical exemplars suchasNapoleon tends to embed them
insufficiently in the wider narratives – such as the French Revolution- of which
they are part, having made a similar argument myself with respect to Nietzsche’s
use of ‘types’ rather than genuine exemplars. But I do not think we need to
accept Angier’s suggestion that sovereign individuals are likely to be unable to
communicate successfully with other sovereign individuals, to say nothing of the
‘herd’ (p. 126). Again, Conant’s reading of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ opens up
a possibility that Angier does not consider: what if that communication takes the
form of exemplarity, as Nietzsche understands it in that text?
[20] Finally, a curious question arises as to the place of this book in the series
of which it is a part. The expressed overall aim of Ashgate’s ‘Intersections: Con-
tinental and Analytic Philosophy’ series is to hasten the demise of the traditional
analytic-continental divide. Yet in his somewhat contentious ‘Recommended
Reading’ section, Angier seems quite clear in his own mind what it means for
a study to be ‘analytic’, and of the value of such approaches to his two figures;
6. Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, ed. and trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 22.
7. See Philip Quinn, ‘Unity and Disunity, Harmony and Discord: a Response to Davenport
andLillegard’, in John J. Davenport andAnthonyRudd (eds),KierkegaardAfterMacIntyre (Chicago:
Open Court, 2001), pp. 327–337.
8. For more on this, see my ‘Getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, MacIntyre and Some
Problems with Narrative’, in Inquiry vol. 50-1 (2007), pp. 34–69.
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he also uses the term ‘continental philosophy’ quite uncritically (p. 147). Yet the
criteria Angier is using for a study to count as ‘analytic’ remain unclear: I suspect
it might surprise the Kierkegaard scholar Edward Mooney, for example, to find
his work straightforwardly described as ‘analytic’.
[21] Despite the above criticisms and queries, this is a worthwhile and
interesting study. Reading Nietzsche and Kierkegaard as partners in critical
dialogue is a philosophically very rewarding exercise, and whatever criticisms
one might have, Angier is to be commended for his contribution to a fascinating
debate which others will hopefully take further.
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